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PRESERVING VALUE IN THE POST-BAPCPA ERA – AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Foteini Teloni* 
 
Abstract 
Through the use of a multivariate regression model, this article studies the effect on debtor 
reorganization values of the shortened reorganization timeframe imposed by the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”). The study shows that BAPCPA is 
positively correlated at a statistically significant level with higher reorganization recoveries. 
This result is attributed to the increased proportion of prepackaged and prenegotiated 
bankruptcies observed in the post-2005 era, as these “fast-track” bankruptcy cases entail lower 
costs and better preserve the firm’s value.  
  
INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act1 (“BAPCPA”), enacted 
in 2005, and its effects on the Chapter 11 reorganization process have been the focus of 
extensive scholarly literature.2  Critics of BAPCPA argue that, by shortening the timeframe 
during which a debtor can reach strategic decisions, the statute adversely affects the debtor’s 
rehabilitation chances.3  This view contrasts with one of the other longstanding criticisms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Richard Squire, for invaluable comments and suggestions on earlier 
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1 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
2 See e.g., Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11- From Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 388 
(2007) (characterizing the 2005 amendments as “ill-conceived”). See also Richard Levin & Alessia Raney-
Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Significant Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603 (2005); Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy 
Reform, 13 NEV. L. J. 174, 202 (2012); Biana Burokhovic, BAPCPA: The Nail in the Coffin for Retailers, Pratt’s 
Journal of Bankruptcy Law, Vol. 6 No. 5 (2010) (focusing on the effect that BAPCPA may have on the 
reorganization of retailing companies); Bruce S. Nathan et al., BAPCPA Rollback as a Cure to Unsuccessful 
Reorganizations? Not so Fast! Bus. Reorg. Comm. Newsl. (American Bankruptcy Institute, Alexandria, Va.) 
(March, 2010) (arguing that BAPCPA is not to blame for the perceived increase in unsuccessful Chapter 11 
reorganizations); Michael G. Wilson & Henry P. Long, Section 503(b)(9)’s Impact: A Proposal to Make Chapter 11 
Viable Again for Retail Debtors, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (2011); Foteini Teloni, The Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: An Empirical Examination of the Act’s Business Bankruptcy Effects, 88 
AM. BANKR. L. J. 237 (2014) (examining empirically the theoretical assertions regarding BAPCPA and its effects on 
the Chapter 11 process). 
3 See e.g., Levin & Raney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11, supra note 2, at 603 (arguing that the 2005 
amendments will “adversely affect the ability of businesses to reorganize.”); Bruce, supra note 2, at 20 (noting that 
the new exclusivity period is insufficient for exceptionally large debtors); Jeffrey M. Schlerf, BAPCPA’s Impact on 
Exclusivity is Hard to Gauge (July, 2007), available at: 
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=7707 (assessing the potential impact of the cap 
placed on the exclusivity extension). ). See also Circuit City Unplugged: Why did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 
Jobs?, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the 
Judiciary House of Representatives, 111 Cong., 1st Session (March 11, 2009) (where scholars and practitioners 
offered their views on whether and how BAPCPA helped lead to the liquidation of Circuit City) (hereafter, “Circuit 
2	  	  
Chapter 11: protracted delays. Indeed, scholars and practitioners have mainly viewed the 
traditional Chapter 11 route as lengthy and costly.4  The formulation of a consensual plan of 
reorganization often requires intensive bargaining among the debtor’s stakeholders over the 
firm’s value, and compliance with elaborate disclosure and voting requirements. These factors 
allegedly drag out the reorganization process, driving up costs.  
 Previous empirical research has shown that after the enactment of the 2005 amendments 
the length of reorganization cases fell by 32%.5 This reduction is attributed to new and modified 
provisions that accelerate the traditional Chapter 11 process.6  In particular, BAPCPA set a time 
limit beyond which the debtor cannot request extensions of its exclusivity period, namely the 
period when it is the only party in interest able to propose a plan of reorganization. 7  
Additionally, BAPCPA limited the overall timeframe during which the debtor may decide 
whether to assume or reject commercial leases in which it is the lessee. 
That same study also showed that after the 2005 amendments, the proportion of debtors 
undergoing “fast-track” bankruptcies, namely prepackaged and prenegotiated cases (collectively 
termed hereafter “preplanned” bankruptcies) increased. Preplanned bankruptcies differ from 
traditional reorganization cases in that the debtor has a reorganization plan already in place when 
it files its Chapter 11 petition. As a result, the time spent in reorganization proceedings is much 
shorter. This rise in prepackaged and prenegotiated cases was anticipated, as the shortened 
timeframe during which the post-2005 debtor must make strategic decisions encourages 
extensive pre-bankruptcy planning. Indeed, the proportion of debtors that underwent a 
prepackaged or prenegotiated case in the post-BAPCPA era increased by 23%. 8  The 
amendments’ addition of section 1125(g) and section 341(e) to the Bankruptcy Code may also 
have made preplanned bankruptcies more attractive. These provisions have the effect of 
specifically promoting and facilitating the employment of preplanned cases. Under § 1125(g), 
and contrary to the case before BAPCPA took effect, the debtor can complete post-petition a 
solicitation process that it began pre-petition even if there is not a court-approved disclosure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
City Unplugged”). But see Teloni, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 2, at 
262, 267 (finding no statistically significant correlation between the implementation of the 2005 amendments and 
unsuccessful reorganizations of debtors).  
4 This appeared to be especially the case before the enactment of BAPCPA in 2005.  For scholarly literature 
referring to the period before the 2005 amendments took effect, see, e.g., James J. White, Harvey’s Silence, 69 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 467, 474 (1995) (arguing that Chapter 11 is a lengthy process characterized by increased costs); 
Lawrence Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 285 (1990) 
(finding that the direct costs of bankruptcy comprise 3% of the firm’s total assets); Edward Altman, A Further 
Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. Fin. 1067, 1077 (1984) (examining a sample of 18 
firms and finding that total bankruptcy costs comprise 16.7% of firm value in the year of bankruptcy). But see 
Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
603, 626 (2009), (providing data indicating that cases move forward more quickly than what it is believed by most 
scholars and practitioners); Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical 
Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 509 (2000) (arguing that the 
costs of Chapter 11 are nominal). 
5 Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases and Refiling Rates: An Empirical Analysis in the post-
BAPCPA Era, AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2015) (on file with the author). 
6 Id. 
7 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (as amended by BAPCPA). 
8 See Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases and Refiling Rates, supra note 5. 
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statement.9  And under § 341(e), the court may, on request of a party in interest, order the U.S. 
Trustee not to convene a creditors’ meeting, if the debtor was able to solicit acceptances before 
the commencement of its case.10  By contrast, under the pre-BAPCPA regime, a creditor’s 
meeting was always required, and therefore the Chapter 11 process was often unnecessarily 
delayed. 
 Additionally, previous research has found that shorter Chapter 11 duration is associated 
with higher reorganization values.11 If this holds, then a natural question is whether post-
BAPCPA debtors, which, as mentioned above, tend to emerge from their Chapter 11 proceedings 
more quickly than before through the use of preplanned Chapter 11s, are also able to exit 
bankruptcy with higher values. In other words, did the shortened Chapter 11 case duration with 
the attendant increase in the proportion of preplanned cases, imposed by BAPCPA, have an 
effect on debtors’ reorganization values? The study presented here answers this question in the 
affirmative, and shows that BAPCPA is indeed positively correlated with higher reorganization 
recoveries. This, in turn, suggests that the faster resolution of Chapter 11 cases in the post-2005 
era, especially through the use of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies, allows the debtor 
to exit its Chapter 11 proceedings having incurred lower costs and preserved more value. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the 2005 amendments that had the effect 
of accelerating the reorganization process and encouraging preplanned bankruptcies. 
Additionally, the route to traditional plan confirmation is described and distinguished from the 
trajectory that preplanned cases follow. This distinction serves to indicate how prepackaged and 
prenegotiated bankruptcy cases can preserve more value for the debtor. Part II states the study’s 
hypothesis and reviews previous relevant scholarly literature.  Part III describes the methodology 
used and presents the article’s finding of statistically significant evidence that post-2005 Chapter 
11 debtors emerge from their reorganization proceedings with higher values. Finally, Part IV 
contains the conclusion and identifies further research questions. 
 
I. ACCELERATING THE CHAPTER 11 PROCESS 
A. SHORTENING THE DEBTOR’S DECISION TIMEFRAME – AMENDING 
SECTIONS 1121 AND 365 
Congress enacted BAPCPA in October 2005. Be it the result of intensive lobbying efforts 
that aimed to promote certain interests, as some suggest,12 or not, the fact is that BAPCPA 
effectuated a comprehensive reform of the Chapter 11 reorganization process. These 2005 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (g). 
10 11 U.S.C. § 341 (e). 
11 Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2007).  See infra Part II 
(B). 
12 See e.g., Miller, Chapter 11- From Boom to Bust and into the Future, supra note 2, at 388 (characterizing the 
enactment of BAPCPA as “perhaps special interests’ biggest victory.”); Levin & Raney-Marinelli, The Creeping 
Repeal of Chapter 11, supra note 2,at 603 (“In general, these changes reflect active lobbying by certain creditor 
groups to improve their positions in bankruptcy cases, particularly in Chapter 11, vis-à-vis debtors and other 
creditors…”). 
4	  	  
amendments altered the debtor-creditor balance by responding, among other things, to mounting 
pressure regarding quick resolution of the debtor’s case.13  With respect to this, BAPCPA aimed 
and succeeded at accelerating the time to plan confirmation by setting a maximum timeframe 
within which the debtor may take certain actions and make strategic decisions.14  Specifically, 
BAPCPA sped up business reorganization cases by modifying two key sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code, namely § 1121 and § 365. 
Section 1121 provides the debtor with one of the most important rights designed to 
promote the debtor’s rehabilitation:15 the right to be the only party in interest that can propose a 
plan of reorganization within the first 120 days of commencement of the Chapter 11 case.16  This 
“exclusivity” right provides the debtor with significant control over its reorganization case, and 
thus enhances the debtor’s bargaining position in the critical early days of its bankruptcy. The 
debtor is insulated from competing plans that could otherwise be submitted by creditors 
disinterested in the distressed firm’s successful emergence, and therefore has a meaningful 
chance of rehabilitation.17  If the debtor files a plan of reorganization within these first 120 days, 
it gets another 60 days to solicit acceptances.18  Both the debtor’s exclusivity and acceptance 
solicitation periods can be extended, but only for cause.19 The “for cause” wording of the statute 
was included by Congress in recognition that, apart from the debtor’s interest in reorganizing and 
restructuring its balance sheet, there are creditor interests that should be also taken into 
consideration and protected.20  However, before the enactment of the 2005 amendments, courts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 3, (prepared statement of Professor Todd J. Zywicki) (arguing that the 
shortened timeframe imposed by BAPCPA was intended to “deal with a particular problem, especially in a lot of 
cases, which is cases that would just sit in the bankruptcy courts, and do nothing, much to the frustration of 
creditors, landlords, and everybody else.”). 
14See Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases and Refiling Rates, supra note 5. 
15 Indeed, the cornerstone of Chapter 11 was intended to be the promotion of the debtor’s rehabilitation. See, e.g., 
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (where the Supreme Court differentiated between 
reorganization and liquidation, stating that, contrary to liquidation, the very purpose of reorganization is to prevent 
the loss of jobs as well as the possible misuse of economic resources.); In re Ionosphere Clubs Inc., 98 B.R. 174 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) where it is emphasized that: “the paramount policy and goal of chapter 11, to which all 
other policies are subordinated…, [which] is the rehabilitation of the debtor.”). See also H.REP. NO. 595, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6179 (stating that “[t]he purpose of a business 
reorganization case …  is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its 
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders.). 
16 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (b). 
17 See J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 213, 294 (1991). Not only that, but this 
level of control afforded to the debtor incentivizes the timely filing of its Chapter 11 petition. In other words, the 
debtor’s management does not postpone the inevitable out of fear that it will lose control, and, therefore, it does not 
delay the bankruptcy filing up to a point that there would be no meaningful chance of reorganization. See H.R. Rep. 
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 231-232. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 231-232. (“Proposed 
Chapter 11 recognizes the need for the debtor to remain in control to some degree, or else debtors will avoid the 
reorganization provisions in the bill until it would be too late for them to be an effective remedy.”). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (c) (3). 
19 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (d) (1) (emphasis added).  
20 Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the debtors’ exclusivity right was unlimited.  Naturally, 
creditors were unhappy about this, and successfully lobbied for a change. Their efforts culminated to the enactment 
of § 1121 as part of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Section 1121 set forth for the first time a limit to the debtor’s 
exclusivity period.  See H. R. Rep. No 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 231-232 (“Proposed Chapter 11 recognizes the 
need for the debtor to remain in control to some degree… At the same time, the bill recognizes the legitimate 
5	  	  
would more often than not find that “cause” existed, and would grant the debtor with the 
extension of the exclusivity period it requested. As a result, the debtor’s exclusivity period could 
stretch to maybe even several years, while creditors were held “hostage,” unable to submit their 
own plans.   
In response to this abuse of the exclusivity-period extension, BAPCPA amended § 1121 
to place a cap on the period during which the debtor can be the only party in interest to file a plan 
of reorganization. Under amended § 1121, any extension of the exclusivity period cannot exceed 
18 months,21 while the period for solicitation of acceptances of the plan cannot be extended 
beyond 20 months after commencement of the case.22  This amendment marked a significant 
deviation from the pre-BAPCPA status quo and triggered the opposition of debtors and debtor-
friendly parties, who argued that even the maximum period available under the new law is too 
short for the formulation of a viable reorganization plan.23 
The other amendment that had the effect of significantly accelerating the debtor’s 
Chapter 11 case was § 365. Section 365 establishes the timeframe during which the debtor-lessee 
may assume or reject commercial leases.  Before the enactment of BAPCPA, the debtor’s 60-day 
deadline could be extended for cause.24  Once again, the courts would almost always find that 
“cause” existed for such extensions, thereby stretching the assumption/rejection period at the 
debtor’s will, often until confirmation of the plan of reorganization.25  Courts would see this 
extension of the debtor’s assumption/rejection period as contributing to the debtor’s chances for 
successful rehabilitation: the debtor was allowed the time it deemed necessary to make an 
informed decision and avoid the repercussions that premature evaluations of leases might entail. 
To be sure, a premature rejection of a commercial lease that would later be proved to be 
beneficial would have the effect of depriving the company of a valuable location, while a 
premature assumption of a lease, which would be subsequently rejected, would entitle the 
landlord to administrative expense priority for the entire post-petition rent owed.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
interests of creditors, whose money is in the enterprise as much as the debtor’s, to have a say in the future of the 
company.”). 
21 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2) (A).  
22 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2) (B). 
23 See e.g., Bruce, supra note 3. See also Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Professor Jack 
F. Williams) (noting regarding the 18-month exclusivity period that “[m]any constituencies in retail bankruptcy 
cases have concluded that it is more difficult to move to a consensual plan and may provide a disincentive to certain 
parties in interest in seeking a consensual plan so that such parties may propose their own plan. Moreover, additional 
time in a bankruptcy case would allow a greater opportunity to obtain exit financing, a difficult task at the present 
time when the financial systems are dysfunctional.”).  
24 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d) (as this was stated before the enactment of BAPCPA). 
25 Ira L. Herman, Statutory Schizophrenia and the New Chapter 11, 25-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 92 (2007). 
26 See David R. Kuney, Protecting the Landlord’s Recent Claim in Bankruptcy: Letter of Credit and Other Issues, 
SUO48 ALI-ABA 811 (June 6-8 2013), (“… prior to BAPCPA, case law had generally supported the notion that if a 
debtor assumes a lease, and then later “breaches” or rejects the lease, all of the damages are entitled to an 
administrative priority payment.”). Within this context, it should be noted that, post-BAPCPA, the landlord is 
entitled to administrative expense priority for the amount of rent owed for only the two years following the later of 
the rejection date or the date of the premises turnover. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (7).  This provision was likely 
enacted in recognition that the expedited decisions that the debtor will now have to reach might lead to the 
assumption of an increased number of premature leases that should be eventually rejected.  
6	  	  
Once again, creditors’ interests were not in the picture. BAPCPA took this into 
consideration and gave voice to landlords, who until then had virtually no input into the 
reorganization process.27  Specifically, the 2005 amendments extended the assumption/rejection 
period that the debtor enjoys to 120 days. This period can be extended for “cause” for an 
additional 90 days.28  However, any further extension requires the consent of the lessor.29  It is, 
therefore, obvious that the 2005 amendments provide landlords with the right to veto the debtor’s 
request for any extensions beyond these initial 210 days.  As a result, the debtor must now decide 
quickly which leases it should keep and which it should reject. Empirical evidence verifies that 
post-2005 debtors do reach quicker decisions about how to treat the leases in which these debtors 
are the lessees. In particular, a study conducted by Kenneth Ayotte examines, among other 
things, the timeframe within which post-2005 debtors decide whether to assume or reject leases 
and other executory contracts.30  The sample studied consisted of large Chapter 11 debtors that 
filed for bankruptcy between 2003 and 2007. The author found that under the pre-BAPCPA 
regime, debtors would usually postpone the decision about which commercial leases to keep or 
discard.  However, this changed after 2005.  According to this study, few post-2005 debtors were 
able to negotiate an extension of their lease assumption/rejection decision-making period.  
Specifically, the data indicated that while the pre-BAPCPA debtor reached a decision regarding 
its leases after 210 days in 48.2% of the cases, the same percentage after the enactment of 
BAPCPA was only 12.7%.31  
From the above it is apparent that the post-2005 debtor has less time to resolve its 
Chapter 11 case. Apart, however, from accelerating the traditional Chapter 11 process, these 
provisions had the additional effect, as mentioned before, of encouraging and promoting the 
employment of prepackaged and prenegotiated Chapter 11s, a type of inherently quick 
bankruptcies.32  This increased use of preplanned cases was further encouraged by another set of 
2005 amendments, analyzed below,33 that aimed specifically at promoting and facilitating this 
type of Chapter 11 cases. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Circuit City Unplugged, supra note 3 (opening statements of Hon. Trent Franks) (arguing that “[t]he 2005 
reform,…, carefully struck a better balance in Chapter 11’s provision affecting relations between retail vendors and 
their mall and shopping-center landlords.”). 
28 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d)  (4) (B) (i). 
29 11 U.S.C. § 365 (d)  (4) (B) (ii) provides, in pertinent part, that: “If the court grants an extension under clause )i_, 
the court may grant a subsequent extension only upon prior written consent of the lessor in each instance.”). 
30  Kenneth Ayotte, Leases and Executory Contracts in Chapter 11, (unpublished manuscript, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2462892).  
31 Id. 
32 See Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases and Refiling Rates, supra note 5. 
33 See infra Part I B (c). 
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B. TRADITIONAL REORGANIZATION VERSUS PREPLANNED BANKRUPTCIES 
a. THE ROAD TO PLAN CONFIRMATION 
Uncertainty over the firm’s value is at the root of delay in Chapter 11 cases.34 Once a 
Chapter 11 petition is filed, intensive negotiations begin among the firm’s various classes of 
creditors and equityholders to reach a consensus as to which will be the value that will be 
assigned to the reorganized firm. This valuation uncertainty can, naturally, be subject to strategic 
manipulation. Depending on her level of priority over the firm’s assets, and in an attempt to 
extract as much value out of the reorganization as possible, each stakeholder will advance a 
different estimate. The higher the level of priority is, the lower the estimate of the firm’s value is 
going to be, and vice versa. For example, a secured creditor will advance a lower estimate of the 
firm’s value in order to end up receiving the whole company. On the contrary, unsecured 
creditors and equity-holders will advance higher estimates in order to be given the opportunity to 
participate in the reorganized firm.35  From the above it is obvious that deciding the firm’s value 
is far from a simple task. Within this context, the Bankruptcy Code has set forth various 
mechanisms to prevent deadlocks and minimize delay.36 However, a traditional Chapter 11 
process, briefly described below, is still much slower than alternatives that a Chapter 11 debtor 
may enjoy. 
The first step in a Chapter 11 proceeding is the filing of a petition with the bankruptcy 
court. Once a company enters Chapter 11, the various stakeholders are grouped into classes 
based on the nature and relative priority of their claims.37 All impaired classes are then called to 
vote on the proposed plan of reorganization that sets forth the new capital structure of the 
company. 38  This voting mechanism is designed to prevent hold-outs that could veto the 
confirmation of the plan.  More specifically, a class is considered to be “impaired,” if the 
reorganization plan alters that class’s claims in any way.39 For the impaired class to accept the 
plan, 2/3 in amount of the allowed interests and 1/2 in number of those voting have to vote in 
favor of the plan.40 Dissidents are bound by the class’ acceptance and are protected under the 
“best interests” test. This means that in order for the plan to be confirmed over the objection of 
certain claimants, these claimants must receive under the plan at least what they would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See generally Johnston, supra note 17, at 285 (1991); Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, 
Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L. J. 1930 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuck, A New 
Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 778 (1988) (“… the existing reorganization 
process resolves the problem of division in a way that suffers from substantial imperfections. These imperfections 
are all rooted in the problem of valuation.”) (emphasis added). See also Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in 
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403 (2005). 
35 See, e.g., Mark Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
537-538 (1983).  
36 For example, contrary to what was happening in the pre-Bankruptcy Code era, a plan of reorganization is 
confirmed if it is accepted by the various classes of claimants without the need for a judicial valuation that would 
entail further delay. 
37 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1), (2), (3). 
38 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (a).  
39 Conversely, a class is not considered to be impaired if according to the terms of the proposed plan, that class 
receives exactly what it was owed. A class that is not impaired is deemed to have accepted the plan, and, therefore, it 
is not called to vote on the plan.. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124.  
40 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (c), (d), (e). 
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received from a Chapter 7 liquidation.41  Adherence to the best interests test requires the 
determination of the company’s liquidation value, something that can introduce further delay of 
the Chapter 11 process.42  In the optimistic scenario that all impaired classes vote in favor of the 
plan, the plan will be submitted to the bankruptcy court for confirmation and the debtor will exit 
the Chapter 11 case. 
 
However, there is always the possibility that a class as a whole will oppose the proposed 
reorganization plan. In this case, the Bankruptcy Code provides for a mechanism that permits the 
uninterrupted advancement of the debtor’s reorganization process. Namely, if a class rejects the 
plan, then the plan can still go forward and eventually be confirmed by the bankruptcy court, if it 
is “crammed down” upon that dissenting class.43  The cramdown proceeding starts with the 
proponent of the plan requesting the bankruptcy court to confirm the plan over the dissenting 
class’ rejection.  The court will cram down the plan if certain requirements are met.44  In 
particular, the plan must not discriminate unfairly against the dissenting class, and must be fair 
and equitable as to that dissenting class.	  Satisfaction of these requirements necessarily implies a 
judicial valuation, which in turn implies further delay of the Chapter 11 process.	  	  
From the above, it is obvious that the road to plan confirmation in a traditional Chapter 
11 case can be lengthy and subject to unpredictable reactions by the various classes.  Opposition 
to the plan by a class as a whole will trigger a judicial valuation in the context of a cramdown 
proceeding that will necessarily further delay the debtor’s Chapter 11 case.  As a result, debtors 
have increasingly employed strategies to reduce their time in bankruptcy. One of these strategies 
involves “quickie” bankruptcies, which can be either prepackaged or prenegotiated cases. These 
cases greatly reduce the time spent in Chapter 11 because the debtor obtains approval of the plan 
from its major constituencies before it files for bankruptcy. 
 
b. PREPLANNED BANKRUPTCIES IN GENERAL 
 Section 1121 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
“The debtor may file a plan with  a petition commencing a voluntary case, or at any 
time in a voluntary case or an involuntary case.”45 
This provision of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly allows the negotiation and formulation of 
the reorganization plan to take place before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. In other words, 
§ 1121(a), along with several other provisions, inserts into the Chapter 11 process a non-
traditional type of bankruptcy, that is, “prepackaged” and “prenegotiated” bankruptcies. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (7). 
42 However, it should be noted that in practice the debtor’s management offers an estimate of the debtor’s liquidation 
value, and the court accepts this estimate without requiring expert testimony.  As a result, there is no significant 
delay of the reorganization proceedings. 
43 11 U.S.C. § 1129  (b)  (1).  
44 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)  (1).  
45 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (a). See Hon. Brian K. Tester et al., Need for Speed: Prepackaged and Prenegotiated 
Bankruptcy Plans, ABI 17th Annual Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, 511 (2010). 
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Prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies made their appearance in the late 1980s. Since 
then they have proven to be an exceptionally useful tool for distressed companies that need to 
delever their balance sheets.46  Even though prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies follow 
slightly different paths, their common feature is that they are much shorter and, therefore, entail 
lower costs than a traditional Chapter 11 case.47  As a result, debtors have been increasingly 
employing this type of bankruptcy to minimize the time they spend under Chapter 11 protection, 
and incur, as it is natural, lower costs. Creditors benefit from the lower costs associated with this 
type of case, as more value is available for distribution.48  
Prepackaged bankruptcies provide a distressed company the quickest alternative to a 
traditional Chapter 11 process, and are even quicker than prenegotiated cases. 49   In a 
prepackaged bankruptcy, and contrary to what happens in a traditional Chapter 11 case, the 
debtor starts negotiating with all impaired creditors and interest-holders before the filing of its 
Chapter 11 petition.  Once the debtor obtains the classes’ acceptances of its proposed plan, it 
files for Chapter 11 with the reorganization plan already in place. In other words, the debtor 
skips the intermediate stages of a traditional Chapter 11 process and proceeds directly to the 
confirmation of the plan.  
In a prenegotiated bankruptcy, negotiations once again take place before the filing of the 
Chapter 11 petition, but, contrary to what happens in a prepackaged bankruptcy, acceptances are 
solicited after the commencement of the formal Chapter 11 case. The consensus of the parties is 
secured by “plan-support,” or “lock-up,” agreements that have been negotiated pre-petition 
between the debtor and its major stakeholders. These plan-support agreements provide that the 
stakeholders will support the reorganization plan in the subsequent voting that will take place 
under the umbrella of Chapter 11.50   
Whether the debtor will elect to undergo a traditional Chapter 11 or a prepackaged or 
prenegotiated bankruptcy depends on a variety of factors.  Undeniably, though, both types of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Dennis J. Connolly, Current Issues Involving Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Plans, Norton Annual Survey 
of Bankruptcy Law (2004); Sandra E. Mayerson, Current Developments in Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans, 838 
PLI/Comm 337 (2002).  See also Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki Shopping for Judges: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large, Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 980-981 (1998-1999) 
(characterizing the use of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies as a “recent phenomenon” that made its 
appearance in the 1990s.). 
47 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 46, at 979.  See also Hon. Brian K. Tester et al., supra note 45, at 520-521. 
48 See infra Part II.B. for relevant scholarly literature. For the purposes of this article, I set aside the concerns 
expressed by scholars and practitioners about the effect that these “quickie” bankruptcies may have on the debtors’ 
successful emergence from bankruptcy, as this is measured by a potential subsequent refiling.  Indeed, a study has 
found that the enactment of the 2005 amendments is correlated at a statistically significant level with a higher 
proportion of refilings. See Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases, and Refilings, supra note 5. 
49 It should be noted, though, that out-of-court restructurings are even quicker. See Ronald Lease et al., Prepacks as 
a Mechanism for Resolving Financial Distress: The Evidence, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 8:4 
(1996) (conducting an empirical study and showing that out-of-court restructurings are the quickest to achieve.) The 
downside, however, of out-of-court restructurings is that they cannot eliminate the hold-out problem. 
50 See Kurt A. Mayr, Unlocking the Lockup: The Revival of Plan Support Agreements under New § 1125(g) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 6 ART. 1 (2006). See also Howard Seife, Delaware Bankruptcy Court's 
Rulings Threaten Use Of “Lockup Agreements” In Prenegotiated And Prepackaged Plans, 121 Banking L.J. 459 
(2003). 
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preplanned bankruptcies provide an appealing alternative to debtors, as they are resolved much 
more quickly than traditional Chapter 11 cases and therefore entail lower costs.51 
 
c. PREPLANNED BANKRUPTCIES IN THE POST-BAPCPA ERA 
As mentioned before, the enactment of certain 2005 amendments accelerated the debtor’s 
decision timeframe.52  Debtors responded to this shortened timeframe by engaging in pre-
bankruptcy planning and, therefore, by increasingly structuring their case as a prepackaged or 
prenegotiated bankruptcy. Additionally, another set of provisions that was enacted in 2005 were 
specifically intended to facilitate and encourage these “fast-track” bankruptcies. Indeed, sections 
1125(g) and  341(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, added by BAPCPA, provide the debtor with greater 
flexibility, and thus greater incentive, to undergo a preplanned Chapter 11 case. 
Under § 1125(b), an acceptance or rejection of the plan can be solicited after the 
commencement of the Chapter 11 case only if there is a court-approved disclosure statement. A 
disclosure statement contains all necessary information regarding the debtor’s financial 
condition, including projections about its operational future.53  
 Before the 2005 amendments, and based on this wording of the statute, any solicitation 
that commenced pre-petition but was completed post-petition without a court-approved 
disclosure statement could be deemed to violate § 1125(b).  Such a violation would result in the 
designation of those votes in connection with confirmation of the reorganization plan.54 The risk 
of violating § 1125(b) existed even in cases where mere technicalities, like the signing of plan-
support agreements, would take place after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition absent a court-
approved disclosure statement. It follows then that the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy case 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 A number of empirical studies have explored the time to confirmation in prepackaged bankruptcies. See, e.g., 
Edward I. Altman, The Role Of Distressed Debt Markets, Hedge Funds And Recent Trends In Bankruptcy On The 
Outcomes Of Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 75, 99 (2014) (finding that prepackaged 
bankruptcies are completed within four months compared to the 16.6 months that a traditional reorganization case 
needs to be completed.); See Lease et al., supra note 49 (examining a sample of 49 firms that filed for Chapter 11 
and finding that companies that undergo a traditional Chapter 11 spend on average 23.2 months in bankruptcy, while 
companies that choose to undergo a prepackaged bankruptcy spend on average 3.3 months under bankruptcy 
protection.); Dennis A. Meloro et al., The Fast and Laborious: Chapter 11 Case Trends, ABI JOURNAL (March 
2013) (examining a sample of large companies that filed for Chapter from January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2012 
and finding that those Chapter 11 cases that were filed in late 2012 concluded more quickly than those filed in early 
2008, attributing, further, this phenomenon to the increased use of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies.). 
52 See supra Part I.A. 
53 See 11 U.S.C.§ 1125 (b). The disclosure statement is an integral part of the voting process.  To be sure, in order 
for all classes to be able to cast their vote intelligently, they have to be sufficiently informed, among other things, as 
to the debtor’s current and future financial status. This need is served by the disclosure statement that is approved by 
the bankruptcy court, and contains all relevant information. This court-approved disclosure statement is sent to all 
stakeholders along with the plan or a court-approved summary of the plan, allowing them to reach an informed 
decision as to how they will cast their vote in connection with the proposed plan. 
54 See, e.g., In re NII Holdings Inc., No. 02-11505 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 22, 2002); In re Stations Holding 
Co., Inc., No. 02-10882 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 25, 2002). 
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would render useless all prior negotiations, as the debtor would need to obtain a court-approved 
disclosure statement in order to be able to continue the solicitation process.55 
This changed with the addition of subsection (g) in 2005.56  Section 1125(g) provides, in 
pertinent part, that: 
                        “notwithstanding subsection (b), an acceptance or rejection of the plan 
may be solicited from a holder of a claim or interest if such 
solicitation complies with applicable nonbankruptcy law and if such 
holder was solicited before (emphasis added)57 the commencement of 
the case in a manner complying with applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 
Under this provision, the debtor can complete post-petition, even before there is a court-
approved disclosure statement, a solicitation process that had commenced pre-petition, provided 
that the requirements set forth by subsection (g) are met.58  It follows then that post-BAPCPA an 
incomplete pre-petition solicitation avoids the risk of being invalidated by a subsequent 
bankruptcy filing. This provision allows the debtor to be more flexible during the negotiations 
with its major stakeholders and thus makes preplanned cases more attractive.59 
Additionally, the enactment of another 2005 provision, that is, § 341(e), further shortened 
preplanned cases and therefore encouraged debtors to choose to undergo such fast-track 
bankruptcies. In particular, section 341(e) provided an exception to subsection (a).  Under § 
341(a), the United States Trustee is required to convene and preside over a meeting of creditors. 
However, on request of a party in interest, and contrary to pre-BAPCPA law, the court can order 
the U.S. Trustee not to convene a creditors’ meeting if the debtor was able to obtain acceptances 
before the commencement of its Chapter 11 case.60  The apparent logic behind § 341(e) is that, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission expressed its concern over this and,, in 1997, it recommended that 
solicitation be allowed to be continued post-petition (Nat’l Bankr. Rev. Comm’n, 1 Report of the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997)). 
56 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (g). 
57 Emphasis added. 
58 See, e.g., In re Reddy Ice Inc., 12-32349 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2012) (debtors used § 1125 (g) in order to 
complete after the commencement of the case the solicitation process that they had commenced pre-petition. Had it 
not § 1125 (g) been enacted, the solicitation process could not have been completed post-petition, rendering the 
entire pre-bankruptcy planning useless). See also In re CIT Group, Inc., 09-16565 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8 
2009). 
59 See James H.M. Sprayregen et al., Need for Speed: Utilizing Hybrid Solicitation Strategies to Shorten Ch. 11 
Cases, 24 BBLR 1351 (2012), also available at: 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/BloombergBNA_Oct%202012.pdf. (citing the prenegotiated case of 
Reddy Ice Inc., which was completed within 36 days from filing. A mentioned before, supra n.65, the debtor, Reddy 
Ice, utilizing § 1125 (g), was able to commence the solicitation process before the filing of the petition and complete 
it post-petition without having to wait for the approval of a disclosure statement, shortening, therefore, its Chapter 
11 case significantly.). 
60 11 U.S.C. § 341 (e) provides, in pertinent part, that: “Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the court, on the 
request of a party in interest and after a notice and a hearing, for cause may order that the United States trustee not 
convene a meeting of creditors or equity security holders if the debtor has filed a plan as to which the debtor 
solicited acceptances prior to the commencement of the case.”.  
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provided that the debtor was able to obtain a sufficient number of acceptances pre-petition, a 
creditor meeting would serve no function.61 
 
II. PRESERVING VALUE IN THE POST-BAPCPA ERA – EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A. HYPOTHESIS  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether BAPCPA had any statistically 
significant effect on debtors’ reorganization values. The hypothesis is that the shortened 
timeframe that the 2005 amendments imposed on debtors to conclude their Chapter 11 cases, 
coupled with the attendant increase of the proportion of prepackaged and prenegotiated 
bankruptcies, had a positive effect on reorganization recoveries. The rationale is that these faster 
cases entail lower costs and better preserve the firm’s value.  
To be sure, previous research has found an inverse relationship between time in 
bankruptcy and reorganization recovery ratios.62  Starting, therefore, from the premise that 
shorter duration in bankruptcy is associated with higher reorganization recoveries, and based on 
the observation that Chapter 11 cases filed after the enactment of the 2005 amendments tend to 
be disposed more quickly than in the past, we expect to find a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the 2005 amendments and reorganization recoveries.  
Especially, given the low administrative expenses and other costs associated with prepackaged 
and prenegotiated cases, we would expect to observe a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the increased use of this type of bankruptcies and debtor reorganization 
values. 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 As mentioned above, one previous study examined the effect of the 2005 amendments on 
the duration of Chapter 11 cases as well as the increased use of preplanned bankruptcies. That 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Hon. Brian K. Tester et al., Need for Speed: Prepackaged and Prenegotiated Bankruptcy Plans, ABI 17th 
Annual Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, 511, 520-521 (2010). See also In re Xerium Technologies Inc., 2010 WL 
3313079 (Bankr. D. Del. May 12, 2010) (the court directed the U.S. Trustee not to convene a creditor meeting). 
62 See infra III (B). See also LoPucki & Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, supra note 12. The authors do not provide 
an interpretation of their finding. However, a finding like this could be interpreted in several possible ways. First, 
lingering in bankruptcy could indicate the distressed company’s weak financial position. This, in turn, could suggest 
that the companies that are eventually able to reorganize in the post-BAPCPA Chapter 11 forum, given the fact that 
they have to do so in a much shorter time than before, are companies that, on average, enter bankruptcy in better 
financial shape than companies that were able to reorganize under the pre-BAPCPA regime. Furthermore, a 
prolonged stay in Chapter 11 might signal to investors the rather weak financial health of the firm, implying that the 
more efficient thing to do would be for the company to liquidate.  This, in turn, could result in the emerging firm’s 
stock trading in lower prices compared to the trading prices of companies that were able to exit Chapter 11 and 
return to their normal operations faster.  Speedy bankruptcies, on the other hand, may signal that the company has 
value and is worth continuing as a going-concern.  Secondly, such a finding could be interpreted as indicating that 
lingering in bankruptcy is itself a cause for reorganization recoveries to drop, as the diversion of management 
attention from the debtor’s operations for a protracted period of time hurts the debtor’s value. Within this context, it 
seems that the 2005 amendments greatly reduce the direct and indirect costs that the debtor incurs in bankruptcy. 	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study’s sample consisted of large public companies that both filed and exited Chapter 11 
between 1997 and 2014.63  The results indicated that BAPCPA is associated with shorter Chapter 
11 case duration. Indeed, the length of traditional Chapter 11 cases fell by 32% in the post-
BAPCPA period. In addition, the study found a statistically significant relationship between the 
2005 amendments going into effect and the increased use of prepackaged and prenegotiated 
cases. The proportion of debtors that underwent a preplanned bankruptcy case after the effective 
date of these 2005 amendments rose by 23%.64 
Several empirical studies have tested relationships among variables such as liquidity, 
profitability, duration, and reorganization values or Chapter 11 costs.65  However, no previous 
study has examined whether this shortened timeframe that the 2005 amendments imposed on 
debtors, with the attendant increase of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies, had any 
effect on debtors’ reorganization values. 
For example, Professors LoPucki and Doherty conducted a study that dealt extensively 
with bankruptcy recoveries. In their article, Bankruptcy Fire Sales,66 LoPucki and Doherty 
compared the going-concern values of thirty § 363-sales with the reorganization values of thirty 
reorganization cases. All Chapter 11 cases studied had occurred between 2000 and 2004. The 
authors calculated the recovery ratios for a sample of § 363 sales, with the ratio defined as sale 
price divided by the debtor’s asset value reported on its Chapter 11 petition. Similarly, recovery 
ratios were calculated as the debtor’s post-emergence value divided by the debtor’s asset value 
listed in its petition.67  In their regression analysis, LoPucki and Doherty controlled for the 
number of days between filing and the entry of the sale order or reorganization, respectively. The 
authors found that bankruptcy duration affected § 363-sale and reorganization cases in opposite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases, and Refiling Rates, supra note 5. 
64 Id. 
65 Though not directly relevant to the present study, it should be noted that M. Carapeto has explored the effect of 
DIP financing in the Chapter 11 process. She examined a sample of companies that filed a Chapter 11 petition over 
the period 1986-1997. This sample was further divided to a subsample of companies that secured DIP financing, and 
a subsample of companies that did not obtain DIP financing. The author found evidence that even though obtaining 
DIP financing does not seem to affect recoveries, its size does matter. In fact, according to Carapeto, the size of DIP 
financing seems to have a positive impact on recovery rates. See Maria Carapeto, Debtor-in-Possession Financing: 
Size Does Matter (unpublished manuscript, London Business School, 1998). 
66 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 12. 
67 Reorganization value was calculated as the market value of shares outstanding the first date that the stock began 
trading after the plan’s effective date plus all liabilities as shown on the reorganized companies’ balance sheets as of 
the effective date of the plan. Total assets, as reported in Exhibit A, were used as a proxy for the firm’s value. Id. at 
19. However, it should be noted that this method of calculating reorganization value was heavily criticized by James 
White in his article Bankruptcy Noir, 106 MICH. L. REV. 691 (2008). In particular, White argues that LoPucki and 
Doherty should have included in the reorganization value only the interest-bearing debt of the company and not its 
total liabilities. To prove his point, White reran LoPucki and Doherty’s regression substituting total liabilities with 
long-term debt and reached different conclusions. White’s article prompted a reply from LoPucki and Doherty 
through their paper, Bankruptcy Verite, 106 MICH. L. REV. 721, 729 (2008). Among other things, LoPucki and 
Doherty argue that if White wanted to take into account only the company’s interest-bearing debt, he should have 
considered not only its long-term debt, as it seems it was the case, but its short-term debt as well.  
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directions: more time in bankruptcy was associated with higher sales recoveries but lower 
reorganization recoveries.68  
Further, Ronald Lease examined a sample of 49 firms that filed a preplanned Chapter 11 
case between 1986 and June 1993.69 Comparing the results with the results from other studies 
that examined out-of-court restructurings and traditional Chapter 11s, Lease’s study found that 
the direct costs of prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies, that is, court costs and 
professional fees, were higher than the costs of out-of-court restructurings but lower than the 
costs of traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations. The same relationship held for creditor 
recoveries: creditor recovery rates in prepackaged cases were higher than in traditional Chapter 
11 cases but lower than in out-of-court restructurings.70 
Brian Betker, who also examined a sample of 49 preplanned bankruptcies filed between 
1986 and 1993, reached results that are contrary to those of Ronald Lease’s study. Betker’s data 
indicated that the direct costs of preplanned bankruptcies are not lower but rather are comparable 
to those of traditional Chapter 11 cases. However, the study went one step further to quantify a 
Chapter 11 case’s indirect costs such as the costs of losing customers, suppliers, and employees. 
With respect to this the study found that preplanned bankruptcies entail lower indirect costs 
compared to traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations.71   
A later study by Brian Betker contradicted the aforementioned results as to the direct 
costs of preplanned bankruptcies.  In particular, Betker examined an updated sample of 
companies that had underwent a preplanned bankruptcy and, contrary to what he had found 
previously, he concluded that direct costs in preplanned bankruptcies are indeed lower than those 
in traditional Chapter 11s.72 
Based, therefore, on the finding of previous scholarly literature that creditors recover 
more when a reorganization case is shorter, and that prepackaged and prenegotiated bankruptcies 
are cheaper, this article will attempt to answer the question whether the 2005 amendments have 
affected creditor recoveries in Chapter 11 cases.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 26. LoPucki and Doherty mention as a plausible interpretation of this result 
that lingering in bankruptcy causes recoveries to drop. But see n.112 where the authors express their skepticism 
about this of this interpretation since they have found in another study that more time in bankruptcy is associated 
with a lower refiling rate. In particular, in their article, Why are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002), LoPucki & Doherty find a negative statistically 
significant correlation between speed and refiling rates in a bivariate analysis. However, this statistical significance 
was lost when speed was added as a variable to a multivariate regression model controlling for additional factors. 
69 Ronald Lease et al., supra note 49. 
70 Id. 
71 Brian L. Betker, An Empirical Examination of Prepackaged Bankruptcy, FIN. MGMT. (Spring 1995). 
72 Brian L. Betker, The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence, FIN. MGMT. (Winter 
1997).	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III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
i. Sample Selection and Dependent Variable Calculation 
To study the effect of BAPCPA on traditional reorganization values, a sample of 
companies that filed for Chapter 11 before and after the enactment of the 2005 amendments was 
examined.  The sample of companies was extracted from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database (hereafter “BRD”) and included large public companies that filed for Chapter 
11 between 1997 and 2014.73  This initial sample was further reduced by excluding finance, real 
estate, and service companies because these companies follow different accounting rules and are 
subject to special regulations.  From the remaining companies, only those that were able to 
emerge as public companies after having undergone a traditional Chapter 11 reorganization were 
included in the final sample.74 In particular, for a company to qualify for inclusion in the sample, 
the company had to have a) emerged from a traditional Chapter 11 reorganization process, that 
is, it must have emerged after effectuating a traditional restructuring of its terms and 
obligations;75 and b) filed a 10-K form post-confirmation.76  
The next step was to calculate each company’s reorganization value.  Following the 
methodology that LoPucki and Doherty used in their study, Bankruptcy Fire Sales,77 I calculated 
reorganization values as the ratio of the company’s post-emergence value over that firm’s value 
when it filed for Chapter 11 (hereafter referred to as “recovery ratio”).  
The numerator of the recovery ratio, that is, the company’s post-emergence value, 
corresponds to the total enterprise value (TEV) of the emerging company.  In particular, the TEV 
was calculated as the sum of the company’s market capitalization, that is, shares outstanding 
multiplied by stock price at the first trading date after the plan’s effective date, plus the 
reorganized company’s debt as of the effective date of the plan. Data for stock prices and the 
number of shares outstanding were gathered from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP).78  If such data were not available in CRSP, then market capitalization data were 
extracted from Bloomberg Professional.79  The reorganized company’s debt is computed as the 
sum of long-term and short-term debt as of the effective date of the plan.80  Data for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database includes data for large public companies with assets of $ 100 
million or more that have filed for bankruptcy. These companies must have also filed a 10-K form with the 
Securities Exchange Commission, for a year ending not less than three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy 
case. 
74 These fields were taken from the BRD. 
75 Plan sales were not included in the sample, even if the debtor company emerged as a stand-alone entity. 
76 Publicly traded companies are required to disclose information on an ongoing basis. A company’s 10-K form 
includes financial statements and provides a comprehensive overview of the company’s business and financial 
condition.  See http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm 
77 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 19. 
78 CRSP provides securities date for all companies that trade in one of the major stock exchanges. Access to CRSP is 
provided through the wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu. 
79 The Bloomberg Professional Service provides a vast array of financial data for companies worldwide. Access to 
this service is enabled through the Bloomberg Terminal. 
80 Including capital leases and current portion of long-term debt. 
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reorganized company’s debt were gathered from the successor company’s balance sheets as 
shown on its first post-confirmation 10-K.  
Finally, the amount of assets that the debtor reported when it filed its Chapter 11 petition 
(hereafter referred to as “listed assets”) is used as a proxy for the firm’s value at the time of the 
filing event.81  Relevant data were gathered from the BRD.	  	  
All data were available for 51 companies. This final sample was further divided into two 
subsamples that reflect the pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA periods.82  
 Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the companies of the sample. All financial data 
were collected from Compustat and correspond to the last fiscal year before the filing event.83  If 
data for the last fiscal year before the filing event were not available, then data for the second-to-
last fiscal year are used. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (Corresponding to the pre-filing period) 
For the total of 51 companies, financial data were gathered from Compustat and correspond to the last 
fiscal year before the filing event. If data for the last fiscal year before the filing event were not 
available, then data for the second-to-last fiscal year are used. The cells reflect the means, and in 
parentheses the corresponding medians, for each item for the periods before and after BAPCPA.  For 
the assets and liabilities, the means and medians presented correspond to the logarithm of the respective 
quantities measured in millions of dollars. 
 Pre-
BAPCPA 
 Post-BAPCPA 
  
Number of Firms 31                                      20 
 
Total Assets  3.45 (3.43) 3.41 (3.45) 
  
Total Liabilities  3.46 (3.39) 3.57 (3.78) 
  
Net Income / Total Assets  -0.32 (-0.15) -0.23 (-0.22) 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Data for “listed assets” were gathered from the BRD. 
82 The earliest Chapter 11 case in the sample was filed in 1997 and the latest in 2013.   
83 Compustat is an extensive database that provides financial data for companies worldwide. Access to Compustat is 
provided through the wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu. 
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EBIT / Total Assets  -0.04 (-0.03) -0.02 (-0.004) 
   
Current Assets / Current Liabilities  0.91 (0.8) 1.01 (0.93) 
 
 Companies before and after BAPCPA seem to have entered Chapter 11 with a similar 
pre-filing financial profile. However, it is interesting to note that firms that reorganized and 
emerged as public companies post-BAPCPA had a slightly higher EBIT-to-total assets ratio. 
Though this increase was measured not to be statistically significant,84 perhaps it is an indicator 
that in the post-BAPCPA era a company has to enter bankruptcy in a better shape to have a 
chance to reorganize in the traditional sense.  
Table 2 compares the means of recovery ratios for the period before and after the 
enactment of BAPCPA.  At an initial level, we observe that the recovery ratio mean rose from 
0.51 in the pre-BAPCPA period to 0.8 in the post-BAPCPA period. Additionally, this difference 
in means is statistically significant at 10% confidence level.  Table 3 reports the recovery ratio 
means separately for preplanned and non-preplanned cases in the pre-BAPCPA and post-
BAPCPA period. The proportion of preplanned cases for the periods before and after the 
effective date of the 2005 amendments is also displayed. 
 
Table 2 
T-test Comparing the Means in Recovery Ratios Before and After BAPCPA 
One-tail t-test comparing the means of traditional reorganization recovery ratios for the 
period before and after the enactment of BAPCPA. For the calculation of the companies’ 
recovery ratios, data were gathered from CRSP, the BRD, as well as the emerging 
companies’ 10-K forms. 
  Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Mean 0.51 0.8 
Observations 31 20 
t Stat -1.37 
 P-value 9% 
 t Critical  1.67 
 Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 The two-tail t-test did not return any statistically significant results. 
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Table 3 
Recovery Ratio Means for Preplanned and Non-Preplanned Cases for the Periods Before 
and After BAPCPA’s Effective Date 
For the calculation of the companies’ recovery ratios, data were gathered from CRSP, the BRD, as well as 
the emerging companies’ 10-K forms.  
 Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Recovery Ratio Means 
(preplanned cases) 
0.77 1.01 
Recovery Ration Means (non-
preplanned cases) 
0.389 0.393 
Proportion of Preplanned Cases  32% 65% 
 
ii. Regression Model and Variable Selection 
As mentioned above, in order to examine whether there has been any statistically 
significant change in traditional reorganization recoveries in the post-BAPCPA era, the recovery 
ratio was calculated for each company.  Also, as the t-test indicated, post-2005 debtors emerge 
with higher reorganization values.   
However, this difference in means may be attributable to additional factors. For example, 
as the descriptive statistics above indicated, post-2005 debtors enter Chapter 11 with slightly 
higher pre-filing earnings. As a result, this might have positively affected these debtors’ eventual 
reorganization recoveries. Also, periods of economic recession could have an adverse effect on 
the values at which companies are able to reorganize.  Therefore, to take account of other factors 
potentially affecting the outcome, a multivariate regression model is employed. The variables 
included in the regression are briefly described below. 
As mentioned before, the dependent variable in the regression model is the companies’ 
recovery ratio, that is, the TEV-to-listed assets ratio. The higher the ratio is, the higher the 
recovery. 
The independent variables included are the binary variables of BAPCPA and economic 
recession, as well as variables measuring the strength, profitability, and liquidity of the company.  
Financial data correspond to the fiscal year before bankruptcy. If such data were not available, 
then they correspond to the second-to-last fiscal year before bankruptcy. Additionally, the 
regression model controlled for the company’s post-confirmation leverage. “Total assets” are 
reported on a book value basis. 
 In particular, the regression model consists of the following independent variables: 
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• BAPCPA: the “BAPCPA” variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
company filed for Chapter 11 after October 17, 2005 (BAPCPA’s effective date), and 0 
if a Chapter 11 bankruptcy was filed before the aforementioned date. 
 
• Economic Recession: a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the company filed for 
Chapter 11 within a period of recession, and 0 if not. In the present sample we observe 
two recession periods: March 2001 to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 
2009.85 
 
• EBIT-to-Total Assets: a variable that measures the company’s pre-filing earnings 
relative to its total assets. 
 
• Net Income-to-Total Assets: a variable that measures the company’s pre-filing 
profitability relative to its total assets. 
 
• Current Assets / Current Liabilities: a variable that measures the company’s pre-filing 
liquidity. 
 
• Liability / Total Assets (pre-filing): a ratio measuring the company’s leverage in the last 
or second-to-last year before the filing event. 
 
Price-to-earnings: To control for changes in stock-market performance that might have 
affected recoveries, the Shiller price-to-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 was used. The 
ratio used corresponds to the month in which each company started trading its shares.86 	  
• Total Debt-to-Total Assets (post-confirmation): The final variable included in the 
regression model was the company’s post-confirmation leverage ratio.  As mentioned 
above, the reorganized companies’ total debt is computed as the sum of their long-term 
and short-term debt after they emerged. Relevant data were extracted from the first 10-K 
form filed after the debtors’ emergence from their Chapter 11 proceedings.87  
 
iii. Results 
Table 4 displays the results of the multivariate regression model that was employed to 
examine BAPCPA’s potential effect on traditional reorganization values.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 I identify periods of recession based on the U.S. cycle of expansions and contractions dates as these are defined by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (www.NBER.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). 
86 Data are available at: www.multpl.com/shiller-pe/table?f=m.	  	  
87 Including capital leases and current portion of long-term debt. 
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Table 4 
Effect of BAPCPA on Recoveries 
Financial data correspond to the last fiscal year before bankruptcy. If such data are not available, then 
they correspond to the second-to-last fiscal year before bankruptcy. All financial data were drawn from 
Compustat. The total debt-to- total assets ratio corresponds to the debtor’s post-confirmation period. 
Data for the numerator of this ratio, that is, total debt, were gathered from the companies’ first post-
confirmation 10-K forms. Data for the denominator of the ratio, that is, total assets, were gathered from 
the BRD.  
 Coefficient P-value 
   
Constant 0.15 84% 
   
BAPCPA  0.48 8%* 
   
Economic Recession -0.51 10%* 
   
EBIT / Total Assets 0.34 62% 
 
Net Income / Total Assets 
 
-0.15 
 
68% 
   
Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities 
-0.0005 100% 
   
Total Liabilities / Total Assets  0.25                                                                                                                                                                  20%
   
Price-to-Earnings                                                           0.0009 97% 
   
Total Debt /Total Assets (post-
confirmation) 
0.3 63% 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
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Consistent with the univariate results presented above,88 we observe that BAPCPA is 
positively correlated with traditional reorganization recoveries at a statistically significant level.  
In particular, the p-value corresponding to the “BAPCPA” variable is 8%. The variable of 
economic recession seems to affect traditional reorganization recoveries as well. In particular, 
the variable of economic recession has a p-value of 10% and is negatively correlated with 
recoveries, indicating that in recession periods recoveries tend to be lower.  Furthermore, the 
EBIT-to-assets ratio is positively correlated with the dependent variable of the regression model, 
indicating that a stronger company has a greater probability of achieving a higher reorganization 
value.  The same results hold if we additionally control in the regression model for firm size.89  
In particular, and similarly with what LoPucki and Doherty observe,90 I find that firm size does 
not affect recoveries. At the same time, the inclusion of the “firm size” variable in the regression 
model did not affect the “BAPCPA” variable, which remained positively correlated with higher 
reorganization values at a statistically significant level.91 
 Summarizing the results of the regression model, we observe that the debtor’s pre-filing 
financial profile did not seem to have a significant impact on the debtors’ reorganization 
recoveries. However, the variable that is of main concern here, BAPCPA, is positively correlated 
with the dependent variable of reorganization recoveries. In particular, the results of the 
regression show that companies that undergo a traditional reorganization in the post-BAPCPA 
period emerge with higher reorganization values. The question raised, therefore, is to which 
characteristic of the post--BAPCPA reorganization era could this increase be attributed.  
 A potential answer to the aforementioned question could be the reduced timeframe within 
which Chapter 11 cases tend to be resolved after BAPCPA took effect. Indeed, as previous 
research has shown, Chapter 11 cases that were filed after the effective date of the 2005 
amendments tend to be resolved in less time compared to the pre-BAPCPA bankruptcies, 
encouraging and promoting extensive pre-bankruptcy planning.92  Indeed, as a result of the 
enactment of BAPCPA, debtors increasingly choose to structure their case as a prepackaged or 
pre-negotiated bankruptcy.93  Naturally, and as previous literature has shown, this type of 
Chapter of 11s entail lower costs compared to the traditional Chapter 11 plan process.94 
 To test the validity of the aforementioned hypothesis, the association of prepacks with 
higher reorganization recoveries had to be examined. Therefore, the BAPCPA independent 
variable was replaced with a binary variable for prepackaged and prenegotiated Chapter 11 
cases. Data regarding whether each Chapter 11 case was preplanned or not were gathered from 
the BRD. The same independent variables included in the first regression model were also used 
here. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See infra Part II (ii) (Table 2). 
89 The logarithm of the total book value of the assets was used as a proxy for firm size. 
90 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 11, at 31. 
91 In particular, the p-value for BAPCPA remained significant at the 10% confidence level even when controlled for 
firm size. 
92 See Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases and Refiling Rates, supra note 5. 
93 Id. 
94 See, e.g., Ronald Lease et al., supra note 49. 
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The results of this regression, displayed in Table 5 below, indicated that preplanned cases 
are positively correlated with traditional reorganization recoveries at a statistically significant 
level.  In particular, the p-value corresponding to the independent variable of “preplanned 
Chapter 11s” is 3%. 
 
Table 5 
Effect of Preplanned Cases on Recoveries 
Financial data correspond to the last fiscal year before bankruptcy. If such data are not available, then 
they correspond to the second-to-last fiscal year before bankruptcy. All financial data were drawn from 
Compustat. The total debt-to- total assets ratio corresponds to the debtor’s post-confirmation period. 
Data for the numerator of this ratio, that is, total debt, were gathered from the companies’ first post-
confirmation 10-K forms. Data for the denominator of the ratio, that is, total assets, were gathered from 
the BRD.  Data regarding the type of case, i.e. whether it was a prepackaged or prenegotiated 
reorganization, were drawn from the BRD. 
 Coefficient P-value 
   
Constant 0.74 26% 
   
Preplanned Chapter 11s  0.51 3%** 
   
Economic Recession -0.28 32% 
   
EBIT / Total Assets 0.81 32% 
 
Net Income / Total Assets 
 
-0.04 
 
91% 
   
Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities 
-0.04 81% 
   
Total Liabilities / Total Assets  0.16                                                                                                                                                                 40%
   
Price-to-Earnings -0.014 52% 
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Total Debt /Total Assets (post-
confirmation) 
-0.22 72% 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
As anticipated, and given that it has already been shown that BAPCPA is positively 
correlated with preplanned bankruptcies, when the regression model included as independent 
variables both the “BAPCPA” variable and the “Preplanned Chapter 11s” variable, both lost 
statistical significance. 
 Concluding, higher reorganization recoveries in the post-BAPCPA era appear to be 
associated with the increased frequency of prepackaged and prenegotiated cases.  This increased 
use of prepacks is, in turn, attributed to the favorable regime that BAPCPA enacted for the 
employment of such strategies. 
   
 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The 2005 amendments have shortened Chapter 11 reorganizations.95 While it is debatable 
whether shortened timeframes reduce a debtor’s chances of reorganizing, this Article has shown 
that, when debtors nonetheless can reorganize, creditors recover more than they did before the 
2005 amendments. Higher recoveries are the result of the increased frequency of preplanned 
cases, which are faster and cheaper than traditional reorganization cases.  
 A question for further research is whether the 2005 amendments have affected sales 
prices in § 363 sales. Previous research has established a significant increase in § 363-sales as a 
proportion of bankruptcy cases since 2005. 96 The condensed bankruptcy timeframe post-2005 
implies lower sales prices, but this implication has yet to be tested empirically. If sales prices are 
indeed lower, the question raised is why do creditors nonetheless push for sales rather than 
reorganizations.  
Given that the 2005 amendments have led to more preplanned cases, which are faster and 
cheaper than traditional cases, another interesting question is whether the proportion of foreign 
debtors that file for Chapter 11 protection in order to avail themselves of these benefits has 
increased. Very few foreign legal regimes allow preplanned bankruptcies. We thus can anticipate 
that more foreign debtors especially now attempt to effectuate a U.S. prepackaged bankruptcy in 
order to reduce the time and costs of complex and expensive cross-border insolvencies.97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 See Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Preplanned Cases, and Refiling Rates, supra note 5. 
96 See Teloni, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 2. 
97 See Mayr, supra note 50, (discussing the benefits that prepackaged bankruptcies can confer to the reorganization 
cases of foreign debtors). 
